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The separation of knowledge from power has been central to the legitimation of
western science; yet, science has been fundamental to the augmentation of modern
state power, especially the perfection of the means of violence. There is a liberal,
secular theodicy that asks ‘if science is pure and universalistic, how is scientific evil
possible?’ How could liberal conceptions of the neutrality and purity of scientific
knowledge be maintained in the face of the twentieth century’s techno-scientific
violence, from the development of chemical, biological, and nuclear weaponry to
the involvement of Germany’s scientific elite in the holocaust? The problem goes to
a tension at the heart of liberal thought about rationality, science, and technology.
The advance of value-free science is taken to be an essential motive force in the
broader progress of human freedom and well-being. But value-freedom also means
that there is no guarantee that technique will not instead augment the power of
destruction.
Liberal thinkers have tended to present the relationship between science and
destructiveness as arising from external political or ideological distortions. This has
been a particular problem for the historical treatment of science in the Third Reich.
The idea that scientists resisted, or that collaboration was unwilling, was important
in the self-legitimation not only of the German scientific elite after the war, but also
for American scientists and intellectuals concerned to present science as naturally
allied with liberal democracy and opposing ‘totalitarianism’.
The authors contributing to Susanne Heim, Carola Sachse, and Mark Walker’s
landmark reassessment, The Kaiser Wilhelm Society under National Socialism,
challenge these liberal presuppositions: ‘‘The relationship between science and
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society should be seen not only in terms of politics influencing science, or even science
influencing politics, but more with the two serving as mutual resources for each other’’
(p. 1). The book challenges the presumption of a conflict between science and National
Socialism. Instead, it points to the ‘‘generous support’’ the Nazi regime offered to
German science, the eagerness of Germany’s scientific elite to draw on this support,
and the willingness of German scientists to align their research to the Nazis’ military
and racial goals (p. 2). The Kaiser Wilhelm Society (KWS) ‘‘was an integral part of the
National Socialist system of domination’’ (p. 4). ‘‘‘Pure science’,’’ Wolfgang Schieder
writes, ‘‘did not stand in opposition to National Socialist science policy in the war but
was indeed one of its pillars’’ (p. 87).
In contrast to the assumption that Nazism held back scientific development, the
authors argue that science under the Third Reich was exceptionally unconstrained.
The use of human experimentation, intimately linked to the Nazis’ program of
genocide, was not something that was forced on scientists: ‘‘Instead, the Third Reich
distinguished itself from democratic states in particular because it loosened,
suspended, or eliminated ethical rules and controls on an unprecedented scale and
thereby either allowed or encouraged scientists, engineers, and physicians to take
advantage of unprecedented, often unethical, and sometimes murderous research
opportunities’’ (p. 10). Science under Nazism was not science restrained but, in a
certain sense, science unleashed.
The book presents the complexities of the politics of science under National
Socialism, including chapters on forced scientific labor, human experimentation,
brain research, aeronautics, chemical and nuclear weapons programs, and research
supporting Nazi goals such as the occupation of Eastern Europe and the Soviet
Union. The scientific elite negotiated their position within what Moritz Epple calls
the ‘‘anarchistic’’ or what Schieder and Ru¨diger Hachtmann call the ‘‘polycratic’’
state structure of National Socialism (pp. 32, 89, 285). The authors emphasize the
active role of the scientific community in constructing alliances that would enable
them to pursue their research agendas most effectively. They describe the complex
couplings between scientific research agendas and Nazi political goals. Epple, for
example, notes that the history of research at the Kaiser Wilhelm Institute for Fluid
Dynamics showed a ‘‘remarkable absence of friction’’ between scientific and state
goals (p. 310). Bernd Gausemeier notes that SS officer and agronomist Konrad
Meyer, who shaped the regime’s biological research policy, ‘‘did not expect vows of
allegiance from his leading researchers but professional commitment in their
domain.’’ The link between ‘pure’ botany and breeding research (promoted by the
autarky policy) ‘‘was not a development imposed on science by politics but rather
resulted from experimental possibilities that were furnished with a certain political
meaning by the scientists themselves’’ (pp. 231, 249). Schieder suggests that the
polycratic political order of Nazism resulted in ‘‘an entirely new latitude’’ that
scientists ‘‘were able to use to their advantage’’ (p. 89). And indeed the lack of
ethical restraint created avenues for research. As Hans-Walter Schuml notes in his
study of the close interaction between the professional ideology of psychiatry and
the eugenic and euthanasia policies of the Nazis, the murder of patients with mental
illnesses and mental disabilities ‘‘opened up new possibilities for psychiatric
research’’ (p. 109).
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The ‘‘lack of friction’’ between science and Nazism also becomes understandable
when one considers scientists as part of the German bourgeoisie. Hachtman argues
that ‘‘When scientific and nonscientific employees of the KWS expressed often
enthusiastic approval of the ‘national awakening’ in late January 1933, they were
thus part of the bourgeois mainstream’’ (p. 27). The Nazi rise to power ‘‘was
accompanied by a chorus of especially bourgeois and middle-class approval’’
(p. 26). Nazi re-militarization and the rhetoric of rebuilding national greatness were
particularly appealing, Hachtman notes, to scientists at the Kaiser Wilhelm Society,
which was closely tied to imperial traditions (p. 28). The Nazi seizure of power
meant that KWS scientists who had been involved in covert military work could
now engage in such work openly (pp. 28–29).
If the political attitudes of KWS scientists were typical of the German middle
class by the beginning of the 1930s, this can be interestingly contrasted with the
political outlook of Albert Einstein as detailed in David Rowe and Robert
Schulmann’s exhaustive edited collection, Einstein on Politics. For Einstein’s
politics was also typically middle class. One could say that Einstein was militantly
middle class, but his was a middle-class outlook deriving from an earlier period. It
had been more widely superseded by the nationalist orientation described by
Hachtman (see Elias, 1996: 136). Einstein’s distinctly anti-political politics, his
hostility to militarism, and his valorization of culture and intellectual life as against
the state can be traced to the particular habitus of the German middle class that took
shape from the 18th into the 19th century, before giving way to nationalism, a
‘‘romanticization of power,’’ and a militaristic cult of hardness and ruthlessness in
the period after 1871 (Elias, 1996: quoting 181, see also 134–154, 204–206). This
transformation of middle-class habitus, set out in Norbert Elias’s study The
Germans, I believe holds the key to understanding Einstein’s politics as detailed in
Rowe and Schulmann’s book. Elias writes:
For many members of the educated German middle classes, ‘culture’ continued
to represent a realm of retreat and of freedom from the unsatisfactory pressures
of a state which accorded them the position of second-class citizens by
comparison with the privileged nobility and denied them access to most of the
leading positions in the state… Withdrawal into the non-political realm of
culture made it possible for them to maintain an attitude of reserve, often highly
critical reserve, towards the existing order without embarking on any active
opposition to the regime itself (Elias, 1996: 127–128).
This kind of ‘‘withdrawal’’ into an apolitical cultural orientation characterized
Einstein’s youthful attraction to solitude and a view of science as an escape from the
cares of the everyday world. This was the meaning of Einstein’s famous image of
the scientist as a lighthouse keeper (p. 280; see also Schweber 2008: 6). A typical
quotation: ‘‘in spite of the troubling, disgusting war I work quietly in my room’’
(p. 61). That solitude was, in part, an expression of distaste for the militarist culture
of the German imperial state. In his aloofness from politics, and his valorization of
culture, Einstein reflected a middle-class orientation that had been more typical
during the 19th century (Elias 1996: 136). Einstein was representative of that
portion of the middle class that retained these earlier sentiments. He was, in that
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way, also characteristically German-Jewish. Historian George Mosse has argued
that the middle-class identification with cultural values was embraced particularly
intensely by German Jews. While the majority of the German middle class turned
from classical notions of Bildung toward romantic nationalist ideas of Volk culture,
the German-Jewish middle class ‘‘clung to the older concept of Bildung’’ (Mosse
1985: 69). Einstein himself identified Jews as carriers of Enlightenment values:
‘‘The striving after knowledge for its own sake, the love of justice… and the quest
for personal independence—these are the motivating traditions of the Jewish
people’’ (p. 320). He suggested that anti-Semitism expressed a hatred for free-
thought, rooted in a revolt of the passions against reason (pp. 315, 321–23).
Einstein’s outlook expressed what Elias called the ‘‘non-political, if not anti-
political and humanist, implications of the concept of culture’’ (Elias 1996: 129).
But Einstein turned this overtly apolitical valorization of culture into a basis for
political engagement—a politics that had a distinctly anti-political character. It is of
great significance that Einstein’s key break from a totally apolitical cultural
orientation, and the start of his engagement with public issues came during World
War One but especially in the early years of the Weimar Republic. As Rowe and
Schulmann say, ‘‘It was under these circumstances that Einstein found his voice,
decisively ended his seclusion, and joined the political fray’’ (p. 4). Einstein’s
political involvement coincided with the end of imperial Germany and the creation
of an institutional basis for the emergence of the German middle class out from
under what had been the domination of the state by the nobility (p. 81, 93). In
contrast to many middle-class Germans who remained hostile to the Republic,
Einstein embraced the Weimar Republic and became an international symbol of it.
For this, he was targeted by rightwing assassins.
Einstein continued to hold onto an ‘‘ascetic, idealized image of the scientists’
realm’’ (p. 26), in Rowe and Schulmann’s words, but he increasingly explicitly set
this other-worldly role in opposition to the powers of the world. This was expressed
politically in Einstein’s intense, lifelong hostility to militarism and military
establishments. Military organization, in his view, embodied an animalistic ‘‘herd
life’’ (Einstein 1982: 10). Elias argues that middle-class moralism contrasted sharply
with the Machiavellian realism that characterized inter-state relations and which
reflected aristocratic codes. The middle-class code was one ‘‘of virtue rather than of
honour’’ (Elias 1996: 139). It was characteristic of the German middle-class
conception of morality that it was universalistic, general, and abstract. The demands
of morality were experienced as deriving from ‘‘an eternal absolute’’ (Elias 1996:
140). Einstein’s politics were a counterposing of both culture and morality to
‘realist’ power-politics. This opposition framed his lifelong assertion of a special
role for intellectuals in public life as carriers of truth and of universal values, and a
view of the special obligation of intellectuals to oppose violence (pp. 420–21,
428–433). Einstein consistently emphasized the primacy of morality, conceived of
as a universal law, over and against the ‘realist’ strategies of states. Einstein asserted
that ‘‘The State exists for man not man for the State’’ (p. 51).
While Rowe and Schulmann show Einstein’s engagement with the political
events and problems of his day, there is the sense that Einstein treated such events in
the world as opportunities to apply or enunciate general ahistorical moral truths, or
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what he called ‘‘those supreme and everlasting values’’ (p. 281). The editors note
that ‘‘he generally preferred to address a problem in abstract terms that embraced
many different situations rather than dwell on the specific conditions that pertain in
one country at a particular time’’ (p. 54). This abstractness of his moral and political
thought often, however, tended toward a certain flatness and predictability in his
pronouncements. The aphoristic character of Einstein’s political statements could
tend toward a rather simplistic moralism (p. xx). Einstein’s thought often resolved
itself into Enlightenment antinomies: individualism vs. collectivism or reason vs.
the passions. Despite his emphasis on universal moral values, Einstein wrote, ‘‘I
know that it is a hopeless undertaking to debate about fundamental value judgments.
For instance, if someone approves, as a goal, the extirpation of the human race from
the earth, one cannot refute such a viewpoint on rational grounds’’ (p. 433). The
aphoristic character of Einstein’s moral pronouncements perhaps followed from this
notion that that they could not be fruitfully argued for—one accepted them or one
did not. But such an acceptance of the fundamental irrationality of value positions
was surely a problem for a thinker who desired a strong role for both humanist
morality and rationality in public life.
The relationship between abstract Kantian moral principles and the concrete
world translated, for Einstein, into a question of where in the world, in what country,
those principles would find a locus: ‘‘I will only stay in a country where political
liberty, tolerance, and equality of all citizens before the law prevail’’ (p. 54).
‘Civilization’ was a key word for Einstein and he conceptualized it as a locus of the
moral principles to which he adhered. He framed his political arguments as appeals
to ‘‘the conscience of the civilized world’’ (p. 425) or the need to ‘‘save European
civilization’’ (p. 283). Yet the assumption that Europe was the seat of ‘civilization’
was called into question by the destruction of the Weimar Republic and the rise of
the Nazis. In 1935, Einstein stated that the Nazi atrocities reflected ‘‘no credit on the
community of nations which calls itself civilized!’’ (p. 294). Although in the 1930s
Einstein publicly praised American political freedoms, even that early assessment
was ambivalent (pp. 55, 242–246), and he became increasingly critical of America’s
commercialism, economic inequality, and militarism. By 1938 he said ‘‘I don’t give
a farthing more for Europe’s future. America joined boldly in the strangulation
maneuver against Spain. Here too [the USA] in fact money rules…’’ (p. 311).
Whereas in 1930, Einstein had suggested that America was charged by ‘‘destiny’’
with a struggle against militarism (p. 239), by the 1950s he was a vocal critic of the
militarization of American society, and the development within the United States of
a paranoid police state (p. 403).
The tensions between Einstein’s attachment to abstract values transcending time
and space and his search for a locus for these values in the world also informed his
Zionism. He tried to reconcile his commitment to Zionism with his internationalism,
but his attempts to do so appear strained and there was, to say the least, a high
degree of tension between these aspects of his political thought (pp. 1–2, 137).
Einstein’s anti-political cultural orientation was reflected in his specifically cultural
Zionism. While he supported a Jewish cultural settlement in Palestine, he explicitly
opposed the goal of forming a Jewish nation state and he was set especially
adamantly against the idea of a militarized Jewish state (pp. 268, 355). Einstein
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quickly realized the fallacy of the early Zionist slogan that Palestine was a ‘‘land
without people for a people without land’’ (p. 30) and consistently called for
reconciliation with the Palestinian Arabs. However, his argument for Zionism did
rely on the colonialist discourse of a civilizing mission. The Jews would bring
science to the Middle East and would modernize and improve the land and the
living conditions of the population (p. 331). Hostility to Jewish settlement was, he
suggested, just rooted in the Arab ruling class’s opposition to this modernization (p.
329). He could reconcile Zionism with internationalism by viewing the former as a
moral and cultural movement, charged with a mission of social uplift. But this view
quickly came into contradiction with the development of Zionism as an actual
political movement (e.g., p. 350). Just as Einstein had in 1919 appealed to the
‘‘public conscience’’ of the Germans against calls for the expulsion of East
European Jews (p. 141), he later appealed to the Israelis’ moral self-image: ‘‘The
attitude we adopt toward the Arab minority will provide the real test of our
standards as a people’’ (p. 505). The appeal to morality against realpolitik was
central to Einstein’s thought and conditioned his hope for peaceful coexistence of
Jews and Arabs in Palestine, though he was aware of the growing fragility of these
hopes. Einstein’s insistence on non-militarization and non-alignment clearly ran
counter to Israel’s subsequent development as a techno-military power aligned with
US hegemony.
The editors’ discussion of Einstein’s socialism hedges this with all sorts of
caveats that seem to me unnecessary. They qualify the discussion of Einstein’s
socialism with the insistence that he ‘‘placed equal if not more importance on the
traditional liberal goal of self-realization of the individual’’ (p. 49). But this misses
the crucial point that it was precisely Einstein’s liberal commitments that drove him,
over time, toward socialism. For he came to see individualism as stunted unless
joined with social cooperation and he saw the ‘‘crippling of the social consciousness
of individuals’’ as being ‘‘the worst evil of capitalism’’ (pp. 443, 445). This was the
crucial historical movement of Einstein’s thought. The conflict between his abstract
Enlightenment ethical ideals and the historical reality of European and American
militarism, which he came to see as intimately related to the capitalist concentration
of economic power, drove his thought in a direction that was utopian. ‘‘Socialism, as
I understand it,’’ he wrote, ‘‘does not exist anywhere today’’ (p. 454). In his 1949
statement for the Monthly Review, he imagined the ‘‘socialist society of the future’’
as the fulfillment of an emerging ‘‘planetary community’’ (pp. 440, 443). Einstein’s
political thought can be understood in terms of a dynamic tension between his
adherence to highly abstract, transcendent ideals, and his active involvement in
history. His ideals could not be realized in any place in the present, therefore only in
a conception of the future.
Einstein’s conception of a future that could be radically different from the present
also justified thinking beyond narrowly technical or instrumental forms of reason.
So he asserted that he had a right to speak out on the need for socialism even though
he was ‘‘not an expert on economic and social issues’’: ‘‘Since the real purpose of
socialism is precisely to overcome and advance beyond the predatory phase of
human development, economic science in its present state can throw little light on
the socialist society of the future’’ (pp. 439–440). It was essential, in Einstein’s
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worldview, that reason should guide human relations. But this form of reason had to
be of a different kind than purely technical rationality. In a message for the Peace
Congress of Intellectuals at Wroclaw in 1948, Einstein said: ‘‘By painful experience
we have learned that rational thinking does not suffice to solve the problems of our
social life. Penetrating research and keen scientific work have often had tragic
implications for mankind… introducing a grave restlessness into his life, making
him a slave to his technological environment, and—most catastrophic of all—
creating the means for his own mass destruction’’. Opposing the scientization of
violence was, Einstein argued, an essential duty of the modern scientist: ‘‘We
scientists, whose tragic destination has been to help in making the methods of
annihilation more gruesome and more effective, must consider it our solemn and
transcendent duty to do all in our power in preventing these weapons from being
used for the brutal purpose for which they were invented’’ (Einstein 1982: 148).
This moral duty required moving beyond a narrowly technical role toward the
intellectual formulation of ‘‘a social-ethical end’’ (p. 440).
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